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Abstract 
The microfinance system of Grameen Bank is a revolutionary tool to eradicate poverty of the rural people 
especially the women of Bangladesh. At present GB is the largest microfinance bank in Bangladesh and 
probably the biggest microcredit organization in the world. It provides loans to assetless and landless poor 
people whom no commercial bank give loan. Microcredit is the most useful and popular financial system in 
the world to face financial crisis of the poor people. Grameen Bank loan distribution has risk of default and 
sometimes the loans are used even dowry which is crime against women right. The rate of interest in 
Grameen Bank is very high and due to high interest rate the poor women can not use the loan in a high 
profitable business to bear this burden, so some of the borrowers lose lands and assets to pay the loan. The 
paper discusses both advantages and drawbacks of Grameen Bank with mathematical calculations in some 
details.  
Keywords: Grameen Bank, Microfinance, Joint liability, Loan, Risk of default 
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INTRODUCTION 
The aim of Grameen Bank (GB) is to 
reduce poverty in both rich and poor 
countries. It gives loan to those people 
whom the government or any 
commercial bank will not give loan 
facility. Both rich and poor countries of 
the world microfinance tries to improve 
access to loans and to saving services for 
low-income, low-wealth people which is 
the fastest-growing and best-known tool 
to combat poverty. The Nobel Prize 
committee awarded the 2006 Nobel 
Peace Prize to Dr. Muhammad Yunus 
and the Grameen Bank for their efforts 
to reduce poverty in Bangladesh. In the 
USA the number of microfinance 
organizations and their budgets has 
grown exponentially in the past decade 
(US Newswire 1999, Meyerhoff 1997).  
The terms microcredit and microfinance 
are often used interchangeably but there  
 
is a difference between them. 
Microcredit refers to the act of providing 
the loan. On the other hand microfinance 
is the act of providing these same 
borrowers with financial services, such 
as savings institutions and insurance 
policies (Sengupta and Aubuchon 2008).  
Bangladesh is a developing country with 
a vast rural society which is about 90% 
of the total population. The majority of 
the rural population, particularly women, 
is subjected to severe poverty, gender 
inequalities and unemployment. Due to 
negligence of the rural development by 
the government and rich population the 
financial condition of the poor in the 
villages remain unchanged after the 
independence of the country in 1971. 
The GB is a well-known institutional 
framework that has achieved 
considerable success in improving the 
socioeconomic conditions of the rural 
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poor, particularly women, in Bangladesh 
(Sarker 2001). 
Dr. Muhammad Yunus, a Professor in 
Economics of the University of 
Chittagong, Bangladesh, has founded the 
GB. The country was slowly recovering 
from a vicious war of independent in 
1971 which had destroyed its 
infrastructure and its productivity and 
murdered much of its intelligentsia. The 
damage caused by the war had been 
amplified by the famine of 1974 and 
suffering of human on a vast scale could 
be witnessed in any town or village of 
Bangladesh (Hulme 2008). He watched 
the people of Bangladesh to starve in the 
famine of 1974 (Yunus 1998). He lent an 
average of $0.64 to a bamboo weaver 
and to 41 others in various purposes. The 
borrowers repaid their loans and 
improved their lots. After this success he 
gave loan to some other persons but few 
of them did not repay the loan. He 
thought that this was because they had 
either used the money unwisely or were 
not trustworthy. He began to experiment 
with ways of (i) approving and 
supervising loans, to ensure they would 
be used for productive investments, and 
(ii) selecting trustworthy clients and 
managing them, so that they would 
repay their loans (Hulme 2008). He 
made a brilliant idea for the best solution 
to help the poor out of their poverty, 
which then grows over the world. It 
initially began in the village Jobra near 
the University of Chittagong, 
Bangladesh and some of the neighboring 
villages during 1976-79.  
Dr. Yunus has observed that commercial 
banks had in-built constraints and are 
aimed only at those who are already well 
off. He contemplated an alternative 
institutional framework that could be 
used to raise the wellbeing of 
impoverished sections of society (Yunus 
1994a,b). At first GB was extended to 
whole of Tangail district (a district of 
Dhaka division) in 1979 with the 
financial support of Bangladesh Bank 
(Central bank of the country) and some 
other nationalized commercial banks. In 
1981 Yunus was preparing to test the 
new lending model on a large scale and 
wanted to open dozens of branch offices 
in five rural districts in addition with 
previous branches. The commercial 
banks declined Yunus’ initial request for 
capital. So that he went to Ford 
Foundation’s office in Dhaka and asked 
for an $800,000 loan guarantee fund as 
security against commercial bank 
lending. After careful appraisal by senior 
staff, in 1981 Ford agreed to the request 
and deposited the requested funds in a 
GB account at London as a framework 
for offering reflections on current 
debates within US philanthropy on 
accountability, support for innovation, 
risk taking and impact. Ford’s loan 
guarantee fund leveraged commercial 
bank lending to GB (Lawry 2008).  
After that success in Tangail, the project 
was further extended to several other 
districts of Bangladesh such as 
Chittagong, Dhaka, Rangpur and 
Patuakhali. In 1983 it was transformed 
into an independent bank by a 
government ordinance, with the name 
Grameen Bank. In 1983, the government 
provided 60% of the initial paid up share 
capital of the bank and the rest 40% 
procured by the borrowers of the bank. 
In 1986, the government share capital 
was reduced to 25% and the rest was 
from the borrowers. In 29 June 2012, Dr. 
Yunus expresses that the share capital of 
government is only 3% and major 97% 
from the members of GB (The Prothom 
Alo, 29 June 2012).GB is the only an 
organization that provides interest free 
loans to the beggars. 
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At present GB is the largest micro-
finance bank in Bangladesh and 
probably the biggest micro credit 
organization in the world. In the 
commercial bank the clients have to 
come for services in banks but GB 
officials go the clients which is a new 
system in microfinance banking sector. 
It is known worldwide for its innovative 
credit delivery to the rural poor (95% are 
women).  It selects assetless, landless 
poor people of Bangladesh, focuses on 
the poor women, and provides credit 
delivery system to meet the diverse 
socio-economic development needs of 
the poor. Many believe that GB’s 
lending has been successful because of 
its joint liability loans have induced 
borrowers to provide mutual assistance 
in hard times (Besley and Coate 1995). 
But Rai and Sjöström (2001) argue that 
joint liability is not enough to efficiently 
induce borrowers to help each other; it is 
also necessary to ask borrowers to make 
reports about each other. 
GB adopted some social beneficial 
works such as group based lending, the 
collateral free lending system, and peer 
group monitoring system. The 
adaptation and learning practice such as 
flexibility of obtaining a loan, a housing 
loan with lower interest rate, mandatory 
and voluntary savings were the most 
significant issue. GB has computerized 
accounting and monitoring system with 
its 2,552 branches out of 2,558 
(Grameen Bank 2009). By integrating 
group-based lending, mandatory savings 
and insurance, repayment rescheduling 
in case of disasters, and similar other 
schemes, it has been able to minimize 
both behavioral and material risks of 
lending. Among the four major types of 
loans, the general loan dominated 
lending, followed by housing loans, 
technology loans, and collective loans. 
The sectoral share of general loans in 
1994 was 35% for agriculture, 16% for 
processing and manufacturing, 26% for 
livestock and fisheries, and 23% for 
other activities such as trade, commerce, 
and peddling.  
Successes and potential benefits of the 
GB micro credit system are as follows: 
• it exhibits an average of 97% 
repayment rates, 
• the members of GB enjoy an average 
household income at least 25% 
higher than nonmembers, 
• the number of GB members living 
below the poverty line has rapidly 
decreased, 
• the landless benefit most, followed 
by marginal landowners, 
• there has been a shift from 
agricultural wage labor to self-
employment and petty trading a shift 
which results in an indirect positive 
effect on the employment and wages 
of other agricultural wage laborers, 
and which has impacted poverty 
alleviation and economic 
improvement at a national level, and 
• group savings have proven as 
successful as group lending. 
 
THE MODEL OF GB 
GB is purely a bank that provides 
banking services only to the poor. It 
extends credit to the poor to invest in 
productive sectors such as processing 
and manufacturing, agriculture and 
forestry, livestock and fisheries, services 
and trade. It is exclusively for poor 
people and it is directly owned by them 
as well. The government of owns 10% of 
GB and has three nominated members 
on the Board of Directors. It enjoys full 
autonomy in discharging both its policy 
and operational responsibilities. GB 
members’ contribution to net household 
income is more than 50% and more than 
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half of the women surveyed have been 
able to pull their families out of poverty 
(Hossain 1988, Todd 1996). The status 
of women has been improved through 
their fruitful participation in GB 
activities. If a woman can escape out of 
the poverty cycle, then the woman 
focused on asset building. Ahmed (1985) 
observed that physical violence and 
other verbal abuse against women 
decreased as a result of GB activities. 
The main objectives of GB are as 
follows (Barua 2006, Sarker 2001):   
• to extend the banking facilities to the 
poor people, 
• to eliminate the exploitation of the 
money lenders who pay loan with 
high interest, 
• to create opportunities for self-
employment for the vast unutilized 
and underutilized manpower resource 
of rural areas of Bangladesh,  
• to bring the deprived people within 
the folds of some organizational 
format which they can understand and 
operate, and can find socio-political 
and economic strength in it through 
mutual support, and 
• to reverse the vicious circle of ‘low 
income, low savings, low investment, 
low income’,  hanging it into an 
expanding system of ‘low income, 
credit, investment, more income, 
more credit, more investment, more 
income’ (Rahman 1993). 
 
The sixteen decisions of GB are as 
follows (Shams 1995): 
1. We shall follow and advance the 
four principles of Grameen Bank: 
Discipline, Unity, Courage, and 
Hard Work in all walks of our 
lives. 
2. We shall bring prosperity to our 
families. 
3. We shall not live in dilapidated 
houses. We shall repair our houses 
and work toward constructing new 
houses at the earliest. 
4. We shall grow vegetables all the 
year round. We shall eat plenty of 
them and sell the surplus. 
5. During the plantation seasons, we 
shall plant as many seedlings as 
possible. 
6. We shall plan to keep our families 
small. We shall minimize our 
expenditures. We shall look after 
our health. 
7. We shall educate our children and 
ensure that they can earn to pay for 
their education. 
8. We shall always keep our children 
and environment clean. 
9. We shall build and use pit-latrines. 
10. We shall drink tube-well water. If 
it is not available, we shall boil 
water or use alum. 
11. We shall not take any dowry in our 
sons’ weddings, nor shall we give 
any dowry in our daughters’ 
weddings. We shall keep the centre 
free from the curse of dowry. We 
shall not practice child marriage. 
12. We shall not inflict any injustice 
on anyone, nor shall we allow 
anyone to do so. 
13. For higher income, we shall 
collectively undertake bigger 
investments. 
14. We shall always be ready to help 
each other. If anyone is in 
difficulty, we shall all help him. 
15. If we come to know of any breach 
of discipline in any centre, we shall 
all go there and help restore 
discipline. 
16. We shall introduce physical 
exercise in all our centers. We shall 
take part in all social activities 
collectively.  
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GB’s organizational structure is highly 
decentralized. The field officers are 
encouraged to send monthly reports 
directly to the Managing Director. He 
reviews these and publishes significant 
issues, concerns, and suggestions 
identified by the officers in GB’s 
internal monthly magazine, which 
reaches all bank officials and workers 
(Auwal 1996). About GB Dr. Yunus 
expresses that the “most distinctive 
feature of Grameencredit is that it is not 
based on any collateral, or legally 
enforceable contracts. It is based on 
trust, not on legal procedures and 
system.” 
 
MICROCREDIT SYSTEM OF GB   
Microcredit is a very effective 
instrument to empower the poor 
(especially to women). It is cost-
effective and sustainable, creates self-
employment for the most poor and 
opportunity to move out of poverty, 
builds on trust and mutual co-operation, 
dedicates to establish credit as a human 
right, and the poor do not have to come 
to the bank but the bank goes to the 
poor. Grassroots organizational 
development is an integral part of GB’s 
credit program which helps in building 
up viable grassroots units in the form of 
groups and centers to promote strong 
group solidarity.  
 
STRUCTURE AND CAPITAL OF 
GB  
The Board of Directors of GB consists 
of 13 members of whom 9 are elected 
from among the borrower shareholders 
and the rest 4 are appointed by the 
government of Bangladesh. This board 
approves bank policies and serves as the 
link between the bank, the Ministry of 
Finance, and other government 
organizations. Various activities of the 
bank are organized and implemented by 
four tiers of administrative set-up such 
as branch office, area office, zonal office 
and head office. The branch offices are 
the lowest operation units of GB which 
are located in the villages. One branch 
serves a cluster of 120–150 centers and 
it has a manager, six or seven workers, 
two to three trainee workers and an 
accountant. The branch offices select 
and organize the target clienteles, 
supervise credit operations, and 
recommend sanction of loans. An area 
office supervises about 10 to 15 branch 
offices which are assisted by program 
officers. The area manager works under 
the supervision of the zonal office that is 
located in the district headquarter which 
is at the top of the hierarchy at the field 
level. A zonal manager supervises about 
8 to 10 area offices. The zonal manager 
is responsible for handling accounts, 
managing funds, and monitoring, 
evaluating and supervising the social 
development programmes. The head 
office of GB is situated in the capital city 
Dhaka. It is responsible for monitoring 
and evaluation, research and 
development, supervision of training, 
and similar activities which are benefited 
from access to information from 
different operational areas. The Chief 
Executive of GB is the Managing 
Director. He is responsible for the 
overall implementation of the policies of 
GB and has to maintain close contact 
with various departmental heads in the 
head office and zonal managers to assist 
in formulation and change of policies. 
The features of GB are as follows 
(Hulme 2008): 
• lend to poor rural women, as they 
were less likely than men to use 
loans badly and were more reliable 
for repayment, 
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• organize women into cells of five 
which took collective responsibility 
for each other’s loans, 
• establish centers where six cells 
consists of 30 women met at a set 
time each week, to apply for loans 
and make repayments, 
• charge a higher rate of interest than 
government schemes and NGO loans 
programmes, 
• require clients to make compulsory 
micro savings each week  and to 
make promises about their social 
conduct, 
• simple, standardized products that 
required regular, small repayments, 
and 
• recruiting and training bright, young 
graduates to administer services to 
minimize corruption. 
GB has started from one village in 1976 
and at present it is covering to 68 
thousand villages (all the villages of 
Bangladesh). It has provided services to 
42 poorest borrowers in 1976. In 1983 
GB had established as a bank with 
36,000 borrowers and a portfolio of $3.1 
million. In 1997 GB had a portfolio of 
$260 million and 2.3 million members, 
most of them were very poor, more than 
90% of them were women, and all of 
them from rural areas. In December 
1999 the branches of GB became about 
1,149 which were operating in 39,706 
villages with 67,691 centers. Also there 
were 2,357,083 members, of which 
2,234,181 were female and 122,902 
male (Grameen Bank 1999). 
The first disbursement was Tk.856 ($27) 
and in 2006, it covers 6.23 million 
borrowers through 2,121 branches of 
whom 96.52% are women and the 
cumulative disbursement is Tk.276.54 
billion ($5.52 billion). The recovery rate 
of the bank is 98.55%. The outstanding 
amount is Tk.31.13 billion ($444.39 
million) and the balance of deposits is 
Tk.35.49 billion ($506.66 million) 
(Barua 2006). By the end of February 
2008 GB had 7.4 million clients and 
outstanding loans of $545 million 
(Hulme 2008).  
 
WORKING SYSTEM OF GB 
Five new members form a group and 5 
to 8 groups form a centre, and all 
members in the centre meet with a loan 
officer weekly and members must sit in 
straight rows, salute, chant, and 
sometimes perform exercises (Hashemi 
1997). The chant related to praise small 
families, prohibit dowry and child 
marriage, promote gardens, admire 
education, and encourage members to 
drink clean water and to use sanitary 
latrines. Each borrower has learned to 
sign their names, and memorize a set of 
vows to self-improvement and save 
$0.02 a week. A group can have only 
one person from any particular 
household and relatives must not be in 
the same group. Groups have either male 
or female members but not both. Each 
group elects a chair, and each centre 
elects a chief. New members must also 
buy a share of stock in GB for 100 taka 
($1= Tk.48.5 in December 1998).  
The group members select a chairperson 
and a secretary, and these positions 
rotate cyclically among the members on 
a yearly basis so that all members can 
learn the responsibility of these 
positions. The chairperson’s work is to 
maintain discipline in the group and for 
supervision of loan utilization by the 
members. All members in the centre 
meet with a loan officer weekly. The 
group chairpersons elect the chief and 
the deputy chief of the centre for a one-
year term. They are required to ensure 
attendance at the general meetings, 
payment of installments, and overall 
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discipline of the centre members. The 
members promise to repay but some 
break their promises. If any member 
fails to repay the loan then other 
members of the group must pay the 
amount of the defaulter and the group is 
banish if they fail to repay the full loan 
at the end of the year and will not find 
loan in future which is called joint 
liability by the GB rule. The safe 
borrowers who repay the loan regularly 
have to subsidize risky borrowers of the 
group who are default. But the GB never 
safe a sincere borrower from a risky one 
and end of the week the GB officer takes 
repayment from the chairperson. 
Sometimes the chairperson has to pay 
full repayment. If the subsidize rates are 
sufficiently high, safe borrowers are 
unlikely to apply for a loan, because they 
face heavy loss by taking loan from GB. 
Joint liability at GB is more subtle than 
the popular perception and more 
complex than the theory. But Rai and 
Sjöström (2001) show that joint liability 
is not enough to efficiently induce 
borrowers to help each other (discusses 
later). Such cross-reporting is used by 
the GB at village meetings where loan 
repayments are collected (Rahman 
1999a). 
Most formal lenders require assets such 
as land, houses, or bank balances to 
avoid risks which also help to take loan 
in future. As a result most borrowers 
repay because they want to preserve 
their future access to loans (Schreiner 
1999). To avoid risk GB applies 
techniques such as 2 members get loans 
first, if they pay the installments 
regularly during the observation period 
of 6–8 weeks, 2 more members get loans 
one month later and after one more 
month, the last member, the chairperson 
receives a loan. Loans have to repay 
within one year (Hashemi 1997). Loan 
sizes are modest, ranging from Tk.3,000 
($75) to Tk.10,000 ($250) and no 
collateral is required for a loan, and the 
borrowers invest the loan in the area of 
their choice. The group chairperson and 
bank workers monitor borrowers to see 
whether they are utilizing the money 
properly (Sarker 2001). Borrowers who 
have paid most of their debts have 
incentives to make sure that their peers 
also repay on time. If the GB fails to 
collect the entire loan with interest 
within one year it may suspend all 
disbursement at a centre until all debts 
are up-to-date. Then the officers may 
also scold the women or detain them in 
the centre longer than normal which 
shames women and may subject them to 
the wrath of their husbands when they 
finally are released (Rahman 1999b).  
The new borrowers get very small loans 
and the amount increases gradually 
depending on creditworthiness. After 
returning previous loan GB offers bigger 
loans such as housing loans with bigger 
disbursements, longer terms, and lower 
interest rates. But housing loans provide 
women with legal rights to the land and 
the house (Islam et al. 1989). Later GB 
made a quantum leap to loans for 
education expenses and for cell phones 
(Zwingle 1998). GB provides loans to 
the poor women for buying Grameen 
mobile phone and women do business by 
offering mobile services in the rural 
areas that have not been linked to the 
nationwide telecommunication schemes, 
as so the poorest women are able to raise 
income and savings (Mair and Schoen 
2007).  
GB has four types of forced savings, 
where saving is compulsory and 
withdrawals are restricted but members 
can borrow against in emergencies and 
GB calls it emergency fund (Morduch 
1999a, Khandker, Khalily and Khan 
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1995). The first two types are not really 
savings at all but rather fees which 
members will never get back. After 
taking their first loan each member must 
pay $0.01 each week to support schools 
(where members learn rules of loans and 
payments of GB) run by the centre. They 
must also pay 0.5% of disbursements in 
excess of $20 into a fund used to cover 
losses from default. The last two types of 
forced savings are real savings. 
Members must deposit 4 cents each 
week into personal savings with interest 
8.5%, and withdrawals are unrestricted. 
In addition, 5% of each disbursement 
goes to the group fund with same 
interest 8.5% and makes loans from the 
group fund after floods and other natural 
calamities. Members cannot withdraw 
their savings in the group fund until they 
leave GB or until they have ten years of 
membership. But a member can borrow 
from the group fund for consumption at 
times of sickness or social ceremony. 
GB manages the emergency fund for use 
as insurance against potential default 
because of death, disability, or other 
misfortunes. This fund is also used to 
provide life accident insurance to all 
group members, repay bad debts, and 
undertake activities that improve the 
health, skills, education, and investment 
opportunities of group members. 
GB wanted to change the social and 
economic structure of rural Bangladesh 
and it supplies loans and insurance, what 
it calls discipline (Montgomery 1996). 
The most important non-financial 
service of GB is social intermediation 
(Bennett 1998) where membership in 
GB gives women a socially accepted 
excuse to gather and to talk (Larance 
1998). The impacts are both 
psychological and economic and not 
only women feel less isolated but also 
strengthen their support networks for 
when various troubles strike. 
As the clienteles GB are from the 
impoverished part of society, it intends 
to provide training on health and 
nourishment and creates consciousness 
among its borrowers regarding the tree 
plantations and clean environments. It 
offers seeds of vegetables and fruits to 
its borrowers and motivates the 
borrowers for making and developing a 
kitchen garden in order to increase the 
daily basis income of borrowers 
(Hossain et al. 2001). 
GB realizes that besides income and 
production risk, lack of financial and 
social discipline is an important source 
of poverty. It encouraged planting trees, 
growing kitchen gardens, raising small 
families, and building houses and 
sanitary latrines. It mobilizes the poor 
into groups for training and 
disseminating information about 
contraceptives, children’s education, 
health and nutrition, and other 
socioeconomic indicators of 
development. Its objective has become 
to empower women by enabling them to 
undertake independent income-earning 
activities (Khandker 1996). GB 
intervention has helped develop happy 
partnerships between husband and wife 
in terms of decision making regarding 
family affairs (Todd 1996). GB 
development programmes have given 
many women a sense of empowerment 
in the society. 
  
Management System of GB 
The staff and clients of GB have the 
strong management system to devolve 
basic decision making and all work 
efficiently.  All the works are done in 
grassroots level and the head office bears 
little responsibility except for strategic 
issues such as basic policies and research 
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and development (Jain 1996, Holcombe 
1995). The GB has developed by a 
unique management system based on 
people’s capacities, learning and 
innovation, transparency and openness, 
honesty and so forth (Holcombe 1995). 
Trust between staff and client is an 
important management system of GB 
and all banking transactions are carried 
out in front of the clients and bank staff. 
Efficient field-based training is given 
both staffs and clients. Democratic 
leadership practices are given by the 
rotation among members of centre and 
group leadership. The most important 
factors behind the successes of the GB 
are its unique decentralized 
organizational structure, client-centered 
delivery system, vision, management 
culture, and human resources 
management. No meaningful 
development can take place in any 
country unless the standard of living of 
the poor is raised and GB takes a 
constructive step to develop the poor 
society as well as the development of the 
country. Due to efficient management 
system more than 60 countries of the 
world started GB types microcredit 
banking. 
Management processes, such as decision 
making, communication and leadership 
are all practiced contingently, 
disregarding conventional wisdom. The 
GB’s managerial personnel are fresh 
graduates without any work experience. 
Its managers at different levels have 
demonstrated that they are capable of 
planning, organizing and implementing 
bank’s development activities 
independently. 
In 1995, the GB decided not to request 
any more funds from donors and instead 
began to fund the bank from collected 
deposits. Armendáriz and Morduch 
(2005) calculated that GB accepted $175 
million in subsidies, including both 
direct donations and soft donations such 
as soft loans, implicit subsidies through 
equity holdings, and delayed loan loss 
provision (Sengupta and Aubuchon 
2008). 
SOCIAL BENEFITS OF GB 
There are six distinct but linked aspects 
of the social benefits of microfinance as 
follows: worth to users, cost to users, 
depth, breadth, length, and scope 
(Schreiner 1999). 
Worth to users is defined as their 
willingness to pay. If a woman is willing 
to bear costs of up to $500 to get a year 
of membership in GB then she would be 
just as well off with $500 more income 
as with a costless year of membership. 
Theoretical models often assume that 
worth to users is equal to the increase in 
business profits due to access to finance 
but microfinance may improve well-
being even if it does not increase 
business profits. The most important 
effect of microfinance is to help 
households to diversify their sources of 
income (Mosley and Hulme 1998, 
Schreiner 1999).    
Cost to users is defined as the sum of 
price costs and transaction costs. Price 
costs are defined as direct cash payments 
to a microfinance organization. Price 
costs borne by users are revenue for the 
organization. Transaction costs are 
defined as non-price costs. They include 
both non-cash opportunity costs such as 
the time to meet each week and indirect 
cash expenses for such things as 
transport and documents linked to the 
use of microfinance. In GB non-cash 
opportunity costs probably exceed 
indirect cash expenses (Bhatt and Tang 
1998). It wants to hide costs to users and 
shows low profits; because the 
government imposes more taxes. Net 
gain to users is defined as worth minus 
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cost, the change in well-being due to 
microfinance.  
Depth is defined as the social value of 
net gains that accrue to a given user. In 
welfare theory, depth corresponds to the 
weight of a user in the social welfare 
function. If society has a preference for 
the poor, then poverty is a good proxy 
for depth (Schreiner 1999). The person 
who has assets less than an acre of land 
can join in GB but in real life some 
members have more wealth than this 
(Matin 1998). Some members are with 
an income less than half the poverty line 
and most are still very poor, and almost 
all are women (Hashemi 1997). 
Breadth is defined as the number of 
users. Breadth is important in 
microfinance because the poor are many 
but the development dollars are few. 
With more than 2.3 million members, 
more than 2.1 million borrowers, and 
centers in more than half of the villages 
in Bangladesh, GB has extensive breadth 
(Schreiner 1999). 
Length is defined as the time frame of 
the supply of microfinance. Expected 
length is important in microfinance 
because society cares about the well-
being of the poor both now and in the 
future. A common proxy for length is the 
ability to attract grants or soft loans from 
government or donors or, in the absence 
of perpetual subsidies, the ability to earn 
enough profit to maintain the real value 
of equity (Schreiner 1999). 
Scope is defined as the number of types 
of services supplied. A microfinance 
organization which offers both loans and 
savings services has greater scope than 
one that offers only loans. Of course 
scope increases with the variety and 
flexibility of the terms of a given type of 
financial contract; a one-year loan for 
$500 is a different product than a two-
year loan for $500 (Adams 1994). GB 
has great scope in some ways and weak 
scope in others. It supplies savings 
services, but almost all savings are 
forced, and withdrawal is often 
impossible. GB provides loans in 
different techniques which are 
recoverable with interest.  
 
Let,   t = 1 to T be the index length of time, 
        ts = index scope for time t, 
       stn = each user’s index, 
      tsN = breadth in time t for a given service ts , 
     tsnW = worth in year t of products ts  to user stn , and 
     tsnC = cost to users. 
Hence we can express the net gain as follows: 
 
                                   NG = −tsnW tsnC .                                                           (1) 
 
The depth function ( )tsntsntsn CWD −  gives the social value of the net gain from contract ts  
for client stn  in year t. The general social welfare function W(.) returns the total social 
benefits B of net gains users, services and time. Now the social benefits are given by; 
 
                             ( )( )tsntsntsn CWDWB −= .                                                       (2) 
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Let 0>δ  be a distant factor and the assumption that W(.) is additively separable across 
users, services and time. Hence social benefits B, can be expressed as;    
             
          Social Benefits, ( )tsntsntsn
T
t
S
s
N
n
t CWDB
t ts
−=∑∑∑
= = =1 1 1
δ .                                    (3) 
 
Let C be the social cost and if B > C, then a project passes the benefit-cost test and is 
deemed a good social investment.  If snt be the number of outputs of type ts  for user stn in 
year t, then the number of outputs being as follows: 
 
                                              ∑∑∑
= = =
=
T
t
S
s
tsn
N
n
t
t ts
oO
1 1 1
δ .                                            (4) 
 
If TtO  be the total output one type of service in a year then; 
                                                 ∑∑
= =
=
t stS
s
N
n
tsn
T
t oO
1 1
.                                                (5) 
Hence (4) becomes as follows:                                           
                The number of outputs, ∑
=
=
T
t
T
t
t OO
1
 δ .                                              (6) 
Now let 
O
BB =  be the unmeasured social benefit per unit of output and 
O
CC =  be 
measured social cost per unit of output. Obviously B > C implies for 0≥O , we find 
O
C
O
B
>  i.e., CB > . Hence a project passes the cost effectiveness test if unmeasured 
average social benefits B  are judged to exceed measured average social costs C . 
Let r > 0 be a choice of social discount rate such that 
r+
=
1
1δ . In real life the World 
Bank and the US government set r = 10% p.a. (Belli 1996, US Office of Management 
and Budget 1972). Let the microfinance organization’s reports stocks only at the start 1−ts  
and end of a year ts . With linear change between the two end points, the daily average 
discount weighted stock is not simply ( )15.02
1
−
− − tt
t ssδ  because the discount is a non-
linear function of time (Schreiner 1999). Again from Schreiner (1997) we get; 
 
         Discount average stock = ( ) ttt ssts ∆+∆− *** . δδ ,                                     (7) 
 
                 where 
δ
δδδ
ln
1
*
−−
=
tt
, 
 
                           1−−=∆ ttt sss , 
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( )
( ) ( )( ){ }1ln11ln 
ln
1 1
2
** −−−−= − δδδδ
δ
δ tt tt . 
 
For r = 10% in the period 1983-97, GB produced about 5.4 million discounted person-
years of membership and produced about 0.5 billion discounted dollar-years of borrowed 
purchasing power. 
 
Let,     0E  = initial equity of the simplest expression of social cost, 
             tF = the discounted fresh flows of funds between public entities get back from the 
end of the time frame. Hence we can write; 
                 Social Cost = t
t
T
t
t
t EFE δδ −+∑
=1
0 .                                                   (8) 
 
In (8), the measurement of first and third terms is simple but that of second term is 
complex. Public entities are defined as those funded voluntarily by taxpayers and private 
entities are funded voluntarily. The government of Bangladesh bought stock and bonds of 
GB and GB borrowed from the public International Fund for Agricultural Development 
and from the public development agencies of Norway and Sweden. All cash flows 
between GB and its members are private. Members choose to join because they expect 
that their benefits will exceed their costs. 
 
Let,          
tG
E = liabilities as part of grants, 
                
tG
R = gifts as revenue grants, 
               
tX
D = discounts an expenses, 
                 tD = average public debt, 
                 tC = the average interest rate paid for public debt, and 
                tm  = the market interest rate for private debt of like risk. 
 
The discount on public debt is the savings that come from borrowing from a public 
source rather than from a private source. Hence the discount on public debt= ( )ttt CmD − . 
The choice of the market interest rate m is as difficult as the choice of the social discount 
rate r.  
True profit tP  is defined as what reported profits 
R
tP would be without the arbitrary 
choice to count some grants not as injections to equity but rather as revenue grants 
tG
R , 
discounts on public debt ( )ttt CmD − , or discounts on expenses tXD  as follows (Schreiner 
1999): 
                          ( )( )
tt XtttG
R
tt DcmDRPP +−+−= .                                        (9) 
 
Every year true profit of GB is much smaller than reported profit due to large discounts 
on public debt. In 1997 reported profit was $300,000 but the true profit was 
000,000,23$− . 
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GB SHOULD FOLLOW EFFICIENT LENDING  
GB loan distribution has risk of default. To induce repayment GB must punish borrowers 
who default such as by denying future loans. It must choose successful borrowers to help 
repay the loans of unsuccessful borrowers to avoid punishment. Joint liability scheme is 
an inefficient system of GB. 
For simplicity let us consider two individual borrowers of GB. Let 0≥ic  denotes 
individual i’s consumption and 0≥iq  be the amount of punishment imposed on i by GB. 
Then individual i’s utility is given by (Rai and Sjöström 2001); 
 
                                   ( ) iiii qcqcU −=, .                                                          (10) 
 
Punishments are a deadweight loss.  Let the maximum feasible punishment is denoted by 
M, so that Mqi ≤≤0 . Let the individuals’ output is denoted by { }hxi ,0∈  where 
0>= hxi  is i’s success and 0=ix  for failure. Let ( ) { } { }hhXxxx ,0,0, 21 ×=∈=  be a 
stable state and the probability of state x is denoted by ( )xp . The individuals are 
symmetric at the time of investment, so that; 
 
                                     ( ) ( )hphp ,00, = .                                                          (11) 
 
Let K be the cost of capital of GB. We assume that; 
 
                                 ( ) ( ) Kxxxp
Xx
2 21 ≥+∑
∈
,                                                   (12) 
 
so that projects are feasible. Let ( )xbi  denotes the payment from individual i to the bank 
in state x, then GB’s break-even constraint if it finances both projects is given by; 
 
                                 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) Kxbxbxp
Xx
2 21 ≥+∑
∈
.                                          (13) 
 
GB must impose lowest punishment on default to repay the loan. Let the GB demands a 
repayment of *R , where MhR ≤≤* , when a project succeeds, and threaten a 
punishment of M if a project succeeds but no repayment is made. Let *R be chosen so that 
the GB breaks even be as follows (Rai and Sjöström 2001): 
 
                              ( ) ( )hphhp
KR
,0,
*
+
=                                                          (14) 
 
If the project fails, the GB observes it and does not punish the individuals for defaulting. 
If there is no defaulter then the GB will not punish any individual. To protect project 
from fail GB should decrease rate of interest in loans. 
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FAULTS OF GB 
The rate of interest is higher which 31% 
is roughly and due to this higher interest 
rate charges GB has criticized (The New 
Nation 2010).  The interest of all 
national and commercial banks in 
Bangladesh is 10-15% (Hossain et al. 
2001). Fernando (2006) has argued that 
there have been existing borrowers of 
GB who face obstacles to pay the loan 
on particular time for having higher 
interest charges. Borrowers only get the 
advantages of using the loan for their 
survival but they do not involve in 
generating profit, so they fails to pay 
higher interest rate on their loan 
(Hossain et al. 2001). Obviously the high 
interest rate becomes burden to the poor 
women who can not use the loan in a 
high profitable business to bear this 
burden. As a result some of the 
borrowers lose lands and assets to pay 
the loan which cause them serious 
miseries and they face serious problems 
due to the loan system of GB. The GB 
loan distribution has risk of default and 
sometimes the loans are used even 
dowry which is crime against women 
right.    
 
TEMPORARY IRREGULARITIES 
IN GB 
In 2000s Yunus propounded that every 
GB loan being used for microenterprise, 
and every microenterprise being 
successful. This independent fieldwork 
showed that GB clients used their loans 
for many different purposes such as 
business, food consumption, health, 
education and even dowry. GB loans did 
not go to microfirms for a single, 
specific investment but they went into 
the complex financial portfolios of low-
income households. GB clients paid the 
kisti (weekly repayments) on their loans 
not from a single microenterprise, but 
from patching together earnings from 
casual employment, self-employment, 
remittances and a variety of loans from 
other sources. The severe floods of 1998 
and the collapse of the bank’s recently 
introduced agriculture loans, exacerbated 
the repayment problem. The crisis in 
2000 when Daniel Pearl, a journalist on 
the New York Times, published an article 
saying that GB was virtually bankrupt 
(Hulme 2008).  
 
RECONSTRUCTION OF GB 
By the early 2001 the irregularities had 
been consolidated and professor Yunus 
announced the launch of Grameen II, the 
replacement of the bank’s earlier 
products by a new range on different 
terms. Its new model Grameen II, takes 
it much closer to a financial systems 
approach. The GB made dramatic 
changes to its services around 2001 and 
2002. The main elements of Grameen II 
are as follows (Hulme 2008): 
• A major focus on savings from 
members and the public. This 
includes voluntary savings, term 
deposits and the Grameen Pension 
Scheme (GPS) which are a long-term 
savings programme. 
• The provision of flexible basic loans 
to members rather than the 
standardized Grameen I, 12-month 
loans. These are for variable amounts, 
can be repaid over three to 36 months, 
have negotiable repayment schedules 
and interest rates are determined by 
loan type (size, length, grace period, 
etc.). 
• The abandonment of joint liability 
and the idea of social collateral. 
• A poverty-focused struggling 
members’ programme, which 
provides small, subsidized loans to 
beggars and encourages them to join 
GB centers. 
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New to Grameen II is a pension fund, 
which allows clients with loans greater 
than 8,000 taka ($138) to contribute at 
least 50 taka ($0.86) per month. The 
client receives 12% per year in 
compound interest, earning a 187% 
return after the mandatory 10-year wait. 
This scheme allows Grameen II to earn 
more money in the present and expand 
services, while delaying payment in the 
near future. Grameen II serves as a good 
example of a second innovation in 
microfinance: flexible loan repayment 
(Sengupta and Aubuchon 2008). 
  Over the period 2002 to 2005 the bank 
tripled the deposits it held ($478 million) 
and doubled its portfolio of outstanding 
loans. The bank’s loans portfolio became 
smaller than its savings portfolio. It built 
up a large fund for bad loan provision 
and profits rose from Tk.60 million in 
2002 to Tk.442 million ($7 million) in 
2005. GB opened 500 new branches, so 
that it had more than 1,700 branches by 
late 2005. It now plays an important role 
as a substantial MFI that meets client 
needs and helps to promote competition 
within the financial markets. At present 
is a very different organization from 
what it was 20 years ago, but it still 
serves as an inspiration for those trying 
to help poor and low-income people in 
their own efforts to improve their lives.  
 
GB MODEL AROUND THE 
WORLD 
The GB of Bangladesh holds an iconic 
position in the world of microfinance. It 
is credited with proving that the poor are 
bankable, the GB model has been copied 
in more than 60 countries; it is the most 
widely cited development success story 
in the world. GB model has been 
followed in 22 countries of Africa, 19 in 
Asia, 3 in Oceania, 15 in America, and 7 
in Europe until 2002 (Hulme 2008). In 
the USA the GB model has been 
suggested for the homeless and for the 
ghetto (Banerjee 1998 and Soloman 
1992). It indicates the successful of GB 
as poverty alleviation program and has 
been internationally accepted by 
different countries of the world. It 
improves the quality of life provide 
better food, better education, as well as 
better housing to the poorer community 
(Wall Street Journal 1998, Thomas 
1995). GB model has been duplicated 
extensively in Bolivia, Chile, China, 
Ethiopia, Honduras, India, Malaysia, 
Mali, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, 
Tanzania, Thailand, the USA and 
Vietnam (Sengupta and Aubuchon 
2008). 
No doubt the microfinance revolution 
has recorded success in most developing 
nations of the world; but it has provided 
little success in some developed 
countries. Schreiner and Woller (2003) 
show the characteristics of the poor are 
different in the two regions. In the 
developing world, jobs are relatively 
scarce and hence the unemployed are 
more likely on average to include 
individuals that are highly skilled or 
better motivated to become 
entrepreneurs. In the developing country 
like Bangladesh 60 to 80% of jobs 
supplied by micro-enterprise but 
microfinance beneficiaries in the 
developed country like USA are 
substantially smaller.  
Although microfinance is benefited to 
the poor of the USA, but group 
formation as like Bangladesh is difficult. 
Hence Bangladeshi pure GB style of 
microfinance is not applicable 
successfully in the USA. 
 
GRAMEEN FAMILY OF 
ENTERPRISES 
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Grameen Family enterprises are as 
follows (Grameen Family of Enterprises 
2005, Grameen Bank 2005): 
 
Grameen Trust 
As a result of the success of GB in 
reaching and serving the poor with 
credit, many people and organizations 
began to think in GB’s way, and wanted 
to learn more about GB and follow its 
principles in their own sphere of work. It 
is primarily to meet this demand that the 
Grameen Trust (GT) came into being in 
1989. Now more countries worldwide 
follow the activities of the GB.  
 
Grameen Fund 
Grameen Fund was incorporated on 17 
January 1994 as a not-for-profit 
company and started operations on 1 
February 1994. Its emphasis is on 
providing finance to ventures that are 
risky, technology-oriented and otherwise 
deprived of financing from existing 
formal lending institutions. 
 
Grameen Communications 
Grameen Communications, a member of 
Grameen family of enterprises, is a not-
for-profit Information Technology 
company. It has been providing 
complete systems solution through 
developing software products and 
services, internet services, hardware and 
networking services and IT education 
services since its inception in 1997 under 
the Companies Act, 1994. 
 
Grameen Shakti/Energy 
Grameen Shakti (GS) is a not-for-profit 
rural power company whose purpose is 
to supply renewable energy to 
unelectrified villages in Bangladesh. GS 
expects not only to supply renewable 
energy services, but also to create 
employment and income-generation 
opportunities in rural Bangladesh. 
 
 
Grameen Shikkha/Education 
Grameen Shikkha is a company in the 
family of Grameen companies. 
Established in 1997 its main objectives 
are to promote mass education in rural 
areas, provide financial support in the 
form of loans and grants for the purpose 
of education, use IT for alleviation of 
illiteracy and development of education, 
promote new technologies and innovate 
ideas and methods for development of 
education, etc. Grameen Shikkha has 
been conducting the Life Oriented 
Education Program, Pre-school/Child 
Development Program, Early Childhood 
Development Program and Arsenic 
Mitigation Program in various districts 
of Bangladesh. 
 
Grameen Telecom 
Grameen Telecom is a company 
dedicated to bringing the information 
revolution to the rural people of 
Bangladesh. Grameen Telecom is 
planning, over the next four years, to 
provide GSM 900/1100 cellular mobile 
phone service to 100 million rural 
inhabitants in 68,000 villages of 
Bangladesh by;  
(1) financing 60,000 members of GB to 
provide village pay phone service and  
(2) providing direct phones to potential 
subscribers. 
 
Grameen Knitwear Limited 
The company is a 100% export oriented 
composite knitwear factory, located in 
the Export Processing Zone in Savar in 
the vicinity of Dhaka, the capital of 
Bangladesh. It has knitting, dyeing, 
finishing and garments production 
facilities. Most of the machinery and 
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equipment have been sourced from 
Europe. The factory is capable of 
producing a very high quality of 
different knit fabrics and garments for 
children, men and women. The fabrics 
and garments are fabric and yarn dyed 
100% cotton, TC, CVC, Polyester with 
lycra (attachment) etc., of various 
counts. The goods are currently exported 
mostly to Europe. Exports are made 
against confirmed irrevocable letters of 
credit. 
 
Grameen Cybernet Ltd 
Grameen Cybernet Ltd. has been 
Bangladesh’s leader in Internet service 
provision since it commenced operation 
in July 1996. Its chief executive has had 
an extensive career in education and 
information technology in the USA and 
is assisted by a team of bright, young 
executives. 
 
CAN MICROFINANCE 
ERADICATE POVERTY? 
We have shown that microfinance of GB 
helps the poorest of the poor to escape 
from poverty. GB is working in 68,000 
villages of Bangladesh. But the situation 
of villages worsens continuously and 
there are beggars, extremely poor people 
in the villages. Some have lost their 
assets to repay the loan.  
The World Bank estimates that in 2001, 
some 1.1 billion people of the world had 
consumption levels below $1 and 
another 2.7 billion lived on less than $2 
per day (World Bank 2001). As 
microfinance continues to grow, 
questions have arisen to focus on who is 
the optimal client. Should microfinance 
target the marginally poor or the 
extremely poor? (Sengupta and 
Aubuchon 2008). Some clients had to 
pay a subsidized microfinance program 
and could not improve their financial 
condition. Some borrowers could not 
escape from poverty due to high interest 
rate. As they can not invest their loan in 
profitable sector, whose profit exceeds 
the rate of interest of the loan of GB. 
The beggars can not take loan from GB, 
because they can not form group, and 
nobody take risk of their repayment. 
Same conditions arose for the very poor 
people. So that GB loans goes to rich or 
non-poor people who can repay in due 
time and the amount of next loan 
increases continually. Morduch (1999b) 
suggests that a dollar increase in income 
for the very poor borrower has a five 
times greater impact than the same dollar 
for the marginally poor borrower. 
According to this suggestion for the 
poverty alleviation, GB should focus on 
the poorest borrowers first, but this is not 
always the case. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper we have tried to describe 
briefly ins and outs of GB of 
Bangladesh. It is the largest 
microfinance organization of the country 
which provides loans the poor. 
Inequality in the ownership of the means 
of production, unequal access to public 
resources, subordination of women, 
dominance of usury capital and 
complicated power relations between the 
rich and poor are the features of life in 
rural Bangladesh. So that GB takes 
rigorous steps to remove the poverty 
from the rural society of Bangladesh. It 
is a decentralized participatory 
organization where both the staffs of the 
bank and the members are actively 
involved in different types of activities. 
It is credited with proving that the poor 
are bankable and its model has been 
copied in more than 60 countries of the 
world and has found success in poverty 
alleviation program. Some limited poor 
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people can improve their financial 
condition by the loans of GB who find 
scope to use the money in profitable 
business. It improves the quality of life 
provide better food, better education, as 
well as better  housing to the poorer 
community. But the high interest rate 
becomes burden to the poor women and 
GB needs to think to provide loans in 
low interest rate to them. We tried to 
show the mathematical calculations in 
some detail.  
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